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Hong Kong’s Linked Exchange Rate System (LERS) has been in operation for 
twenty-five years during which time many other fixed exchange rate systems 
have succumbed to shocks and/or speculative attacks. This fact alone 
suggests that the LERS is a robust system which enjoys a large measure of 
credibility in financial markets. This paper intends to investigate whether this is 
indeed the case, and whether it has been the case throughout its 25-year 
history. In particular we will use the tools of modern finance to extract 
information from financial asset prices about market expectations that are 
related to the credibility of the LERS. The main focus is on how market 
participants ‘judged’ the various changes made to the LERS, such as the 
‘seven technical measures’ introduced in September 1998 and the ‘three 
refinements’ made in May 2005. These changes have been characterizes as 
making the system less discretionary over time, and we hypothesize that they 
have also made it more credible as revealed in the prices of exchange rate 
related asset prices. We also investigate the relationship between interest 
rates and exchange rates in the current system in light of modern models of 
target-zone exchange rate systems. We will examine whether the intra-
marginal intervention in November 2007 changed the dynamic properties of 
the exchange rate as suggested by such models.  1
I. Introduction and summary. 
Hong Kong’s Linked Exchange Rate System (LERS) has been in 
operation for twenty-five years during which time many other fixed exchange 
rate systems have come and gone, succumbing to shocks and/or speculative 
attacks. This fact alone suggests that the LERS is a robust system which 
enjoys a large measure of credibility in financial markets. This paper intends 
to investigate whether this is indeed the case, and whether it has been the 
case throughout its 25-year history. In particular we will use the tools of 
modern finance to extract information from financial asset prices about market 
expectations that are related to the credibility of the LERS. The main focus is 
on how market participants ‘judged’ the various changes made to the LERS, 
such as the ‘seven technical measures’ introduced in September 1998 and 
the ‘three refinements’ made in May 2005. These changes have been 
characterized as making the system less discretionary over time,
1 and we 
hypothesize that they have also made it more credible in the eyes of financial 
market participants.
2  
We will define credibility with reference to the behaviour of asset prices, 
principally nominal interest rates, the US dollar exchange rate and various 
derivative products related to these underlying instruments. Our strategy is to 
attempt to infer from asset prices how market participants judged reforms of 
the system and its future. We do so in part by extracting information about 
exchange-rate expectations from market prices, in part by investigating 
exchange-rate and interest-rate volatility, and in part by studying the dynamics 
of the exchange rate itself. To place the empirical analysis in context, we start 
in the next section by recalling the main features of the LERS, highlighting 
how the nature of the official exchange rate commitment evolved over time 
and outlining the main features of refinements that were introduced. In section 
III we implement a recently developed technique for estimating the distribution 
of exchange rate expectations from market prices and use the results to 
investigate how this distribution changed around the times of significant 
changes in the LERS. We find that, generally speaking, the two major 
                                                 
1 Latter (2007a). 
2 Kwan et al. (1999) employ a number of methods developed in the target zone literature to 
measure the credibility of Hong Kong’s currency board during the Asian financial crisis in 
1997-8.   2
changes in the exchange rate aspects of the system, the ‘seven technical 
measures’ and the ‘three refinements’ achieved their goals of reducing 
uncertainty about the future value of the exchange rate and can therefore be 
said to have increased the credibility of the system. Furthermore, the effects 
of the announcements were reflected rapidly in market prices. 
In section IV we study the evolution over time of the volatility of the 
exchange rate and the interest rate differential between HKD and USD 
instruments. It is frequently suggested that fixing the exchange rate, i.e. 
reducing its volatility, will come at the expense of increased interest rate 
volatility because the central bank will need to adjust the interest rate in 
response to pressures in the foreign exchange market. This, however, need 
not be the case if the fixed exchange rate is perfectly credible, because in this 
case excess demand for foreign exchange by some market participants will be 
offset by opposite positions taken by other participants who have confidence 
that the exchange rate peg will be maintained. Our results show that volatility 
in both the exchange rate and interest rates declined after the introduction of 
the seven measures and spill-overs from exchange rate volatility to interest 
rate volatility was reduced. The evidence relating to the three refinements is 
less clear-cut, but volatility in the money and foreign exchange markets were 
much lower in the most recent period of the system than before the seven 
measures. 
In section V we turn our attention to the period after the latest refinements 
of the LERS in May 2005 which established a symmetric band for the 
HKD/USD exchange rate around 7.8. We investigate the properties of the 
movements of the spot exchange rate within the band, in particular whether 
they are mean reverting and bounded - which would indicate that markets 
believe the Link to be maintained – whether they have been influenced by 
intra-marginal interventions by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). 
We also discuss the influence of a more flexible renminbi exchange rate on 
both interest-rate and exchange-rate movements in Hong Kong, and relate it 
to a ‘puzzle’ in the Hong Kong dollar forward market where the forward 
exchange rate at times have been outside the intervention limits implied by 
the current version of the LERS. Our conclusions again imply that market 
prices generally suggest that the Link is viewed as a credible system by   3
market participants.  
In the final section of the paper we draw together our conclusions and 
speculate about the broader reasons for the main results that we find, namely 
that the credibility of the LERS as revealed by asset prices seems to have 
increased over time.  
 
II. A brief history of the LERS. 
The evolution of the monetary system in Hong Kong since 1983 has been 
thoroughly described and analysed in recent works by John Greenwood and 
Anthony Latter and does not need to be repeated here.
3 Instead we highlight 
only those events that are most directly related to our evaluation of how 
market participants reacted to the changes in the system that were introduced 
over time.  
 
The exchange rate commitment. 
The LERS was introduced in October 1983 with a fixed exchange rate 
between a certificate of indebtedness (CI) and the US dollar at the rate of 7.8 
HKD/USD. Holding CIs gave the note issuing banks the right to issue Hong 
Kong dollar (HKD) bills. Hence the fixed value of the CI effectively translated 
into a fixed exchange rate between the HKD and the USD for currency 
transactions. Although, as we shall see, the system has undergone a number 
of modifications since then, this fixed rate between the CI and the USD has 
never been changed as illustrated by the light blue line in Chart 1.  
Although in theory an exchange rate commitment involving only currency 
might through arbitrage also lead to a convergence between the exchange 
rate in the interbank market and the fixed rate for currency, this did not 
happen in practice. A wider exchange rate commitment for reserve balances 
of banks - Authorized Institutions, or AIs, as they are referred to – was 
therefore introduced in September 1998 at the rate of 7.75 HKD/USD. This 
was a weak-side commitment in that the HKMA was ready to purchase 
                                                 
3 See Greenwood (2008) and Latter (2007a,b). Both authors have been close observers of 
monetary affairs in Hong Kong during this period, Greenwood as a private sector economist 
and, since 1998 member of the Currency Board Subcommittee of the Exchange Fund 
Advisory Committee, and Latter as Deputy Secretary for Monetary Affairs in the Hong Kong 
government from 1982 to 1985 and as Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority from 1999 to 2003.   4
unlimited amounts of Hong Kong dollars for US dollars to prevent a 
weakening of the currency beyond that rate. No strong side commitment was 
introduced at that time. The weak side commitment was gradually moved from 
7.75 to 7.8 between April 1999 and July 2000 as shown by the red line in the 
chart.  
The exchange rate commitment was altered once again in May 2005 
when a symmetric convertibility zone (or target zone to use the terminology of 
the academic literature) was introduced with a strong side Convertibility 
Undertaking (CU) at 7.75 HKD/USD (the black line in Chart 1) and the weak 
side CU gradually being gradually moved from 7.8 to 7.85 over a period of 5 
weeks. 
A question that we will investigate in Section III is how the change in the 
‘rules of the game’ affected expectations in the foreign exchange market, in 
particular whether the mere announcement of the change had an impact, or 
whether it took some time for market participants to be convinced. We will 
also look at the implications of the introduction of the symmetrical target zone 
in 2005 for the dynamics of the exchange rate within the zone, specifically 
whether it conforms to the predictions of the theoretical literature on target 
zones. 
 
The ‘Accounting Rules’ of July 1988. 
During the first five years of operation of the LERS interbank clearing 
operations were carried out entirely in the private sector through banks’ 
clearing accounts with the HSBC. There was no formal official involvement in 
the market and hence no possibility for the authorities to influence liquidity 
conditions in the interbank market by means of open market operations. This 
changed in July 1988 with the introduction of the ‘accounting rules’ which 
required the HSBC to hold reserve balances in an account with Exchange 
Fund. The size of the account should be no less than the net clearing 
balances of the rest of the banking system. 
The significance of the new rules for our purposes was that the 
authorities now had the possibility to influence money market conditions 
directly making it possible for them to have an additional degree of control 
over interest rates and the exchange rate. Greenwood (2008), p. 214 notes   5
that this gave the authorities more discretion to steer the markets in the 
direction they considered desirable. As the data necessary for carrying out our 
analysis only start in 1996 we are not able to assess the effect of this 
additional degree of freedom on the behaviour of market participants. 
In December 1996 a RTGS system was introduced in Hong Kong and at 
the same time all AIs were required to hold reserve balances with the HKMA 
which had been established in April 1993. Again, due to data limitations we 
are unfortunately unable to assess whether these events had any material 
impact on the volatility of interest rates and exchange rates as well as on 
market expectations. 
 
The ‘Seven Technical Measures’ of September 1998. 
The financial crisis in East Asia in 1997 and 1998 provided the impetus 
for another modification of the LERS. The so-called ‘seven technical 
measures’ were introduced in September 1998 with the purpose of 
strengthening the system. For our purposes the two most significant features 
were (i) the introduction of the weak-side CU which has already been 
described above, and (ii) the introduction of a discount window facility which 
made it possible for banks to borrow from the HKMA against collateral. The 
objective of the latter was to dampen interest rate volatility that was very high 
during the crisis. (See Chart 1 for an illustration of the interest rate movements 
at the time.) 
Did the seven technical measures instil greater confidence in the LERS 
and did they alter the volatility of the exchange rate and interest rates? 
Sections III and IV provide the answers. 
 
The ‘Three Refinements’ of May 2005. 
Starting in the fall of 2003 the Chinese renminbi came under pressure to 
appreciate. Judged by non-deliverable forward contracts on the CNY, market 
expectations indicated a steady increase in the expected appreciation of the 
Chinese currency. The Hong Kong dollar also came under pressure, perhaps 
due to expectations in the market that the Hong Kong authorities would follow 
any move by their counterparts on the Mainland to allow the currency to 
appreciate with respect to the USD. Two consequences materialized. First,   6
the HKD/USD spot rate started to appreciate (see Chart 1) and since the 
LERS did not contain an explicit strong side convertibility commitment there 
was considerable uncertainty about the extent of the appreciation that the 
HKMA would allow. Second, expectations of appreciation meant a forward 
premium on the HKD relative to the USD and therefore a negative interest 
rate differential. As US interest rates also were quite low at the time, HKD 
short-term interest rate declined to close to zero. (Chart 2) 
The combination of very low interest rates, which risked creating 
overheating in the economy in general and in asset markets in particular, and 
increased uncertainty about the exchange rate level, which could call into 
question the credibility of the LERS, suggested the need for an official 
response. It came on May 19, 2005 in the form of ‘Three Refinements’ to the 
LERS. These were (i) the introduction of a strong side CU at 7.75 HKD/USD, 
(ii) moving the weak-side CU to 7.85 (in small steps over a 5 week period) 
thus creating a symmetric convertibility zone around 7.8, the convertibility rate 
for CIs which, as explained above, had been in effect since 1983, and (iii) 
giving the HKMA the possibility to intervene inside the convertibility zone    7
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In addition to investigating how, and how fast, expectations of market 
participants reacted to the ‘Three Refinements’, in Section V we will study how 
exchange-rate and interest rate movements in the refined system compare with 
theoretical predictions of target-zone models of exchange rates. In particular we 
will ask whether the dynamics of the exchange rate was altered when the HKMA 
conducted its first – after the introduction of the three refinements - intramarginal 
intervention in the foreign exchange market in October 2007. 
 
III.  The reaction of market expectations to reforms of the system. 
In this section we will use measures of exchange rate expectations derived 
from asset prices to infer how market participants assessed two reforms of the 
linked exchange rate system, ‘the seven technical measures’ introduced in 
September 1998 and ‘the three refinements’ of May 2005. Our main interest is to 
examine whether ‘the market’ seemed to have confidence in the promises made 
by the HKMA in each of these instances and, if so, whether this confidence was 
reached rapidly through the words of the Monetary Authority or had to be ‘earned’ 
over time through its deeds. 
Expectations in foreign exchange markets are often judged by quotes in 
the forward market, as the forward rate should, leaving aside the possibility of risk 
premia, reflect market participants’ expectations of the most likely value of the 
future spot rate. While having an estimate of the central tendency of expectations 
is useful for some purposes, in this section we are more interested in how 
refinements to the LINK affected the range of expectations. To this end we use 
two measures derived from prices of foreign exchange options: the implicit 
probability density function of exchange rate expectations, and an estimate the 
maximum depreciation or appreciation expected by the market over a given 
horizon.  
A word of caution on the use of market prices to infer expectations of 
market participants. Just as the forward rate may be a biased estimate of the 
future spot rate because of risk premia, the measures we derive will only be as 
good as the underlying model that is used to ‘reverse engineer’ the underlying 
diversity of expectations. Hence while market prices have the advantage of being 
forward-looking, it must be kept in mind that interpreting the information contained 
in them is conditional on a theory about how asset prices are determined in the   10
market. In what follows we proceed on the assumption that the models we use 
accurately reflect the true determinants of asset prices. 
 
 
III.1   Characterizing market expectations using probability density 
functions.  
  Market expectations about a currency’s exchange rate in the future and 
market attitudes towards the risk of particular realisations can be compactly 
summarized in the entire risk neutral probability density function (PDF) which can 
be inferred from option prices. As noted, option values have the desirable property 
of being forward-looking in nature and thus are a useful source of information for 
gauging market sentiment about future values of financial assets.  By studying a 
range of option prices with different strike prices, the distribution of all possible 
levels of future exchange rate can be estimated and used for assessing the 
credibility of exchange rate policies.  The technique for extracting market 
expectations from option prices in this study is based on that in Malz (1997).
4 
Chart 3 shows the PDFs of the Hong Kong dollar exchange rate in a 1-
month horizon as at 2 September 1996, 1 September 1997, 4 and 14 September 
1998 and 13 September 1999, i.e. before and after the Asian financial crisis in 
1997-8; and before and after the seven technical measures.
5  The statistics of the 
PDFs are reported in Table 1. The PDF as at 2 September 1996 shows that the 
exchange rate was not expected to be traded higher than 7.8. However, when the 
financial crisis emerged in the summer of 1997, the PDF as at 1 September 1997 
dispersed with higher standard deviation and coefficient of variation. The 
uncertainty about the exchange rate anticipated by the market deepened and was 
extremely high in early September 1998 before the introduction of the policy 
measures. This is reflected from the fat-tailed PDF (high excess kurtosis) as at 4 
September 1998 with large dispersion (high standard deviation and coefficient of 
variation). All statistics of the PDF reflects the potential depreciation of the Hong 
Kong dollar beyond 7.8 anticipated by market participants when the spot 
exchange rate was traded at 7.7458. After the announcement of the policy 
measures, the PDF as at 14 September 1998 became narrow with a high 
                                                 
4   A similar technique was applied in Mizrach (1996), Campa et al. (1997) and Söderlind (2000) to 
derive market expectations of “effective” bandwidths for ERM currencies.   
5   The HKMA introduced a time element into the CU on 14 September 1998.   11
probability around the mean. The change is more evident at their fat tails.  In 
Chart 4, the fat tail of the PDF as at 4 September 1998 extends well beyond 8.5, 
while the fat tail as at 14 September 1998 disappears at 8.4. The substantial 
reductions in the corresponding statistics of the standard deviation and coefficient 
of variation also demonstrate the reaction of the market.
6  This demonstrates that 
the seven technical measures reduced the uncertainty about the exchange rate 
and thus confined the market expected exchange rate movement within a 
relatively narrow range. Furthermore, the change in expectations occurred 
immediately upon the announcement of the measures, suggestive of a high 
degree of credibility of the Monetary Authority. The narrow shape and 
corresponding statistics of the PDF as at 13 September 1999 suggest that the 
effects of the measures had been incorporated into the option prices to a large 
extent over the following one year, in particular the skewness and excess kurtosis 
reduced significantly compared with the PDF as at 14 September 1998.  
 
Chart 3: PDFs of Hong Kong dollar exchange rate before and after seven 
technical measures. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Statistics of PDFs (before and after seven technical measures). 
                                                 
6   The smaller skewness and excess kurtosis of the PDF as at 4 September 1998 (compared with 
those as at 14 September 1998) are due to the extremely dispersed distribution.  
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Chart 4: Tails of PDFs of Hong Kong dollar exchange rate before and after 
seven technical measures. 
 
It should be noted that the Government’s operations in the stock market in 
August 1998 could also be reason for the change in exchange rate expectations 
in September 1998.
7 As the culminating events of the stock market operations and 
the introduction of the seven measures occurred within two months, it is not 
possible to determine the contribution of each separately to the change in market 
sentiment.  However, the fat-tailed PDF as at 4 September 1998 at least reflected 
that the effect of the stock market operations has not been rapidly incorporated 
into expectations by participants in the financial markets. In other words the 
narrowed PDF as at 13 September 1998 indicates that the introduction of the 
seven technical measures was useful even though not completely decisive. 
                                                 
7 This point was raised by Charles Goodhart. 
Statistics 02/09/1996 01/09/1997 04/09/1998 14/09/1998 13/09/1999
Mean 7.7325 7.7642 7.7659 7.7852 7.7688
Standard Deviation 0.0135 0.0624 0.3034 0.1032 0.0226
Skewness 0.0054 0.0988 1.4071 2.2532 1.6520
Excess Kurtosis 0.0004 0.3776 3.1965 8.2383 5.2016
Coefficient of Variation 0.0017 0.0080 0.0391 0.0133 0.0029
Note: The coefficient of variation (CV) is a normalized measure of dispersion of a probability distribution.
It is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation  to the mean.
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The PDFs and the associated statistics of the exchange rate in a 1-month 
horizon before and after the three refinements on 18 May 2005 are shown in 
Charts 5 and 6 and Table 2.
8 The fat-tailed PDFs in Chart 5 with negative 
skewness and high excess kurtosis before the three refinements reflected the 
potential appreciation of the Hong Kong dollar anticipated by market participants. 
It is likely that these expectations were associated with the expectation of a 
revaluation of the renminbi and the belief by some market participants that the 
Hong Kong dollar might de-link from the US dollar and follow the renminbi. After 
the introduction of the three refinements, the PDFs in Chart 6 became narrow with 
a high probability around the mean, while the skewness became positive and the 
excess kurtosis reduced substantially. The PDF as at 20 May 2005 shifted slightly 
to the weak side compared with the PDF as at 18 May 2005, that may be due to 
the change of the weak-side CU from 7.8 to 7.85.  As the exchange rate was now 
in a target zone regime, its PDFs became more or less symmetric, even after the 
revaluation of the renminbi on 21 July 2005. The mean of the PDFs was at the 
strong side of the Convertibility Zone as both the spot and forward exchange rates 
were stronger than the central parity. The PDFs demonstrate that the three 
refinements effectively reduced the uncertainty about the exchange rate and 
confined the market expected exchange rate movement well within the 
Convertibility Zone. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8   The data as at 26 November 2004 are chosen because the option market somehow had less 
uncertainty about the exchange rate during early 2005. See section III.2 below for additional 
discussion.   14
Chart 5: PDFs of Hong Kong dollar exchange rate before three refinements. 
 
 
Chart 6: PDFs of Hong Kong dollar exchange rate after three refinements. 
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Table 2: Statistics of PDFs (before and after three refinements). 
Statistics  04/01/2004  04/10/2004  24/11/2004     
Mean  7.7550   7.7903   7.7643      
Standard Deviation  0.0331   0.0310   0.0705      
Skewness  -1.6643   -2.6068   -2.6285      
Excess Kurtosis  5.2326   12.1466   7.6962       
Coefficient of Variation  0.0043   0.0040   0.0091      
    18/05/2005  20/05/2005  18/08/2005  18/11/2005 
Mean  7.7870   7.7890   7.7684   7.7506  
Standard Deviation  0.0270   0.0287   0.0146   0.0113  
Skewness  0.0418   0.0407   0.0218   0.0266  
Excess Kurtosis  4.8352   4.4506   2.6836   3.6633  
Coefficient of Variation  0.0035   0.0037   0.0019   0.0015  
Note: The coefficient of variation (CV) is a normalized measure of dispersion of a probability distribution. It is defined as the 
ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. 
 
 
III.2    Market expectation of maximum appreciation/depreciation of Hong 
Kong dollar. 
  Another way of assessing the credibility of modifications to the LINK is to 
estimate the market expectation of the range of the movement of the exchange 
rate inferred from option prices. Hui et al. (2008a) propose an approach for 
estimating the maximum appreciation/depreciation of a currency expected in the 
financial market based upon a first-passage-time approach.
9  This approach 
considers that path dependency is a critical factor that allows substantial 
appreciation/depreciation of an exchange rate triggered by an important 
economic-political event during a time horizon. There is a significant difference 
between expected maximums measured by the path-independent approach which 
is used for constructing probability density functions in the previous subsection, 
and by the path-dependent approach.  The measurement of the path-independent 
approach depends on the exchange rate only at the end of some time interval, 
and not on a particular path. This means that the path-independent 
maximum/minimum does not take into account the exchange rate reaching at a 
high/low level during some time interval. The expected maximum 
appreciation/depreciation of the Hong Kong dollar estimated by the first-passage-
                                                 
9   The use of the first-passage-time approach is first proposed by Hui and Lo (2008) for 
estimating the realignment risk of a currency within a target zone.  This approach is different 
from the path-independent approach (such as in Mizrach (1996) and Söderlind (2000)) which 
provides the expectations of the exchange rate movements only at the end of a given time 
horizon and ignores any substantial movement triggered by an important economic-political 
event during a time horizon.    16
time approach could therefore be used to assess the expected trading bands 
anticipated by the market and hence the credibility of the Linked Exchange Rate 
system. 
  The model parameters used to estimate expected maximum 
appreciation/depreciation of the Hong Kong dollar are spot exchange rates (the 
Hong Kong dollar value of a unit of the US dollar, HKD/USD), Hong Kong dollar 1-
month HIBOR, US dollar 1-month LIBOR, and volatility implied from 1-month at-
the-money-forward currency option prices covering the period from 2 January 
1996 to 8 October 2008. The forward exchange rate is computed from the interest 
rate parity between the Hong Kong dollar and US dollar.  Chart 7 presents day-by-
day estimates of 1-month expected maximum appreciation/depreciation of the 
Hong Kong dollar. A general observation prompted by this chart is that the 
estimated maximum expected trading range of the Hong Kong dollar exchange 
rate has been quite narrow with the notable exceptions of the 1997-98 and 2003-
2005 episodes. This is presumably a reflection of both the credibility of the peg 
and the absence of major shocks striking the system except in these two 
episodes. 
 
Chart 7: 1-month expected maximum appreciation/depreciation of the Hong 
Kong dollar. 
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Looking more closely at the period of the Asian financial crisis from October 
1997 to September 1998, the expected maximum deprecations of the Hong Kong 
dollar were much beyond 7.8 on a number of days, while the spot exchange rate 
was traded around 7.75. In particular, the market expected maximum depreciation 
in 1-month horizon was at 8.01 on 31 August 1998 (see Chart 8). Following the 
announcement of the seven technical measures, the expected trading bands 
narrowed substantially and the expected maximum depreciation fell immediately 
to 7.8. While it increased to 7.83 a week after the announcement, it continued to 
decline thereafter and a month later it was again below 7.8 and would effectively 
stay there until the spot rate had been moved to that level as well after which the 
expected maximum trading range was very narrow around the weak-side 
commitment of 7.8 HKD/USD. The technical measures thus reduced the 
uncertainty of market participant in a short period of time.   
  The expected trading bands in the one-month horizon began to widen 
again when appreciation pressure on the Hong Kong dollar emerged in October 
2003 due to revaluation pressures on the renminbi. Uncertainty about the Hong 
Kong dollar exchange rate remained until the implementation of the three 
refinements on 18 May 2005. As there was only the weak-side CU at 7.8 during 
the period, the Hong Kong spot exchange rate was traded below 7.8 and the 
expected maximum appreciations were frequently substantially below 7.75.  
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Chart 8: 1-month expected maximum appreciation/depreciation of the Hong 
Kong dollar. 
  
  Looking more closely at the months preceding the 18
th of May, we note 
(see Chart 9) that the narrowing of the expected trading range had already started 
in the beginning of 2005 as if market participants anticipated the three 
refinements. A possible reason for this could be the efforts of the HKMA to 
persuade market participants that there was no to assume that pressure on the 
renminbi would lessen the resolve of Hong Kong’s authorities to allow the Hong 
Kong dollar to appreciate far from the 7.8 level. In a Viewpoint article published on 
November 24, 2004, the Chief Executive of the HKMA, Mr. Joseph Yam, 
discussed the reasons for the negative differential between Hong Kong dollar 
interest rates and the corresponding US dollar counterparts.
10 He gave reasons 
why he believed that they would only be temporary and wrote about investors 
that: “Some may, of course, have longer staying power than others, but I think 
none has longer staying power than the Linked Exchange Rate system itself”. He 
also wrote that using the Hong Kong dollar as a proxy for speculating on an 
appreciation of the renminbi “is, to put it mildly, a little far fetched”. He continued 
                                                 
10 Viewpoint articles by Mr. Yam are published on the HKMA website. They are frequently used to 
explain the assessment by the Monetary Authority of significant monetary and financial 
developments, and can thus be thought of as attempts to influence the public’s understanding of 
HKMA policies. 
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to suggest that it may take time for investors to realize this but that when they do 
“Hong Kong dollar interest rates will rise”.
11  
Again in another Viewpoint article dated December 31 he again discussed 
the issue of using the Hong Kong dollar as a proxy for speculation on an 
appreciation of the renminbi and, suggesting it may be risky, he wrote that “[t]hose 
using the Hong Kong dollar as a proxy for taking positions on the renminbi should 
take note”. 
These statements can, we believe, be interpreted as signalling to the 
markets that they should not assume that the low interest rates in Hong Kong 
would last forever. As low interest rates can be related to expectations of 
appreciation of the Hong Kong dollar, the Viewpoint articles could have had the 
effect of diminishing these expectations ahead of the changes brought about by 
the three refinements in May 2005. The actual implementation of the three 
refinements consolidated the relatively small differences between the spot rate of 
the Hong Kong dollar and its expected strongest value which usually has been 
well above the strong-side CU at 7.75.  This reflects that the policy once again 
reduced the uncertainty of market participants. 
 
Chart 9: 1-month expected maximum appreciation/depreciation of the Hong 
Kong dollar. 
 
                                                 
11 Rising Hong Kong dollar interest rates would imply a narrowing interest differential and, through 
interest parity, a smaller expected appreciation of the Hong Kong dollar.  
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IV.  Volatility of Hong Kong dollar exchange rate and interest rate and 
their interaction. 
 
  It is sometimes asserted that pegging the exchange rate entails a trade-off 
between interest-rate volatility and exchange-rate volatility. The argument is that in 
order to stabilize the exchange rate in the face of excess demand or supply in the 
foreign exchange market, the authorities must adjust interest rates in order to 
induce offsetting capital flows. Conversely, a central bank that conducts monetary 
policy using the rate of interest must allow the exchange rate to adjust in response 
to shocks. 
  While there is certainly some truth to this line of reasoning, it is incomplete 
since it does not take into account the possibility of stabilizing speculation in the 
foreign exchange market by the private sector in a perfectly credible fixed 
exchange rate system. For when the private sector has complete confidence in 
the peg, there will be less need for interest rate adjustments to preserve the fixed 
exchange rate. Private sector fund flows will ensure stability much as they do in a 
monetary union. 
  In this section we investigate the evolution of volatilities in the exchange 
rate and interest rates using models popular in the finance literature to capture 
changes in volatilities over time as well as their interactions.  As the movements of 
the Hong Kong dollar interest rate should follow the US dollar counterparty under 
the Linked Exchange Rate system, the interest rate differential between them is 
used to gauge the interest rate volatility. This means that the volatility of the Hong 
Kong dollar interest rate relative to the US dollar interest rate is the measure for 
assessment.
12 
The Hong Kong dollar and US dollar (HKD-USD) interest rate differential 
and the change (in natural log difference) in the Hong Kong dollar exchange rate 
are modelled under a univariate AR(1) – Exponential GARCH(1,1) specification 
respectively as follows:
13 
t t t y w w y ε + + = −1 1 0      ( 1 )  
                                                 
12 Fung and Yu (2007) employ Bayesian analysis, which takes into account the exchange rate 
movements and interest rate differential to assess the credibility of the Convertibility Zone. 
13 We are grateful to Pierre Siklos for suggesting that the exponential garch specification could be 
more appropriate than a symmetric garch model in view of the asymmetric nature of the exchange 
rate commitment during the period after the technical measures and before the three refinements.   21
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where  t y  is the HKD-USD interest rate differential or the change in the Hong 
Kong exchange rate (HKD/USD), and σ is the corresponding volatility. The 
presence of asymmetry is measured by the estimated coefficient γ1. The tenors of 
the interest rate differentials are overnight and 3 months.  The estimation results 
of the volatility σ , one year before the Asian Financial crisis (from 2 January 1996 
to 30 June 1997), before and after the seven technical measures on 7 September 
1998 and the three refinements on 18 May 2005 are in Table 3.
14 
 
Table 3: Volatility Comparison. 
 
        
    Volatility (in standard deviation) 
        
        
      HKD – USD Interest rate 
differential 
           
   HKD/USD 
exchange 
rate 
Overnight 3-month 
        
        
January 1996 to  
June 1997 
 0.00025  0.00394  0.00064 
        
Technical measure 
on 7 September 
1998 
1-year 
before 
0.00034 0.01122  0.02256 
1-year after  0.00022  0.00585  0.00204 
        
Three refinement 
on 18 May 2005 
1-year 
before 
0.00028 0.00201  0.00095 
1-year after  0.00029  0.00304  0.00071 
 
The results in Table 3 show that both the exchange rate volatility and 
interest rate volatility increased substantially during the Asian financial crisis from 
September 1997 to September 1998, compared with those during the pre-crisis 
period.  After the announcement of the seven technical measures, they declined 
to levels comparable to the pre-crisis period. This is consistent with the findings 
based on the option implied volatility of the Hong Kong dollar exchange rate in the 
previous section.  However, the reduction in volatility is not so noticeable when we 
compare the periods immediately before and after the three refinements. In 
                                                 
14 The currency crisis in Thailand occurred in July 1997.  The estimation results of Eqs. (1) and (2) 
are available upon request.   22
particular the volatility of the overnight interest rate differential has increased 
afterwards. This may be due to a number of large scales initial public offering of 
stocks during the period between 2005 and 2007 that increased the demand of 
the Hong Kong dollar and overnight funding. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note 
that when we compare exchange rate and interest rate volatilities in the current 
target zone (i.e. after the three refinements) with those that prevailed in the pre-
crisis period, there is no evidence that the more rule-based exchange rate system 
currently in place is associated with any increase in interest rate volatility. 
To study the relationship between the exchange rate and interest rate 
volatility, a bi-variate GARCH model is modified and employed to estimate the 
mean and volatility spill-overs between them. A conditional mean spill-over under 
a AR(1) specification is defined as: 
t t t t
t t t t
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where IRD refers to the HKD-USD interest rate differential (overnight or 3-month) 
and EXR refers to the HKD/USD exchange rate return.  The mean spill-over is 
measured by the estimated coefficients w12 (from the lagged exchange rate return 
to the interest rate differential) and w21 (from the lagged interest rate differential to 
the exchange rate return). 
The conditional variance-covariance matrix is used to capture the volatility 
spill-over.  The matrix is constructed as: 
1 , 12 12 1 , 12 12 1 , 2 1 , 1 12 12 , 12
1 , 11 22 1 , 22 22
2
1 , 2 22 22 , 22
1 , 22 11 1 , 11 11
2
1 , 1 11 11 , 11
− − − −
− − −
− − −
γ + β + ε ε α + =
γ + β + ε α + =
γ + β + ε α + =
t t t t t
t t t t
t t t t
h h c h
h h c h
h h c h
   (4) 
The volatility spill-over is measured by the estimated coefficients  11 γ  (from the 
lagged conditional variance of the exchange rate return to the conditional variance 
of the interest rate differential) and  22 γ  (from the lagged conditional variance of the 
interest rate differential to the conditional variance of the exchange rate return).  
Table 4 presents the estimation results under the bi-variate GARCH specification 
with mean and volatility spill-overs during the periods before and after the 
implementation of the policy measures. 
The results show that the volatility spill-over from the exchange rate return   23
to the interest rate differential (i.e.  11 γ ) was statistically significant and positive 
before the seven technical measures. However, the volatility spill-over from the 
interest rate differential to the exchange rate return (i.e.  22 γ ) is statistically 
significant and negative. This is consistent with the notion that an increase in 
exchange rate volatility triggered an increase in interest rate volatility before the 
seven technical measures. Conversely, the increase in the interest rate volatility 
dampened the exchange rate volatility.  During the period between the 
implementations of the seven technical measures and 23 September 2003 (when 
revaluation pressure on the renminbi emerged),  11 γ  is statistically insignificant 
while  22 γ  is statistically significant and positive with a smaller magnitude 
compared with the figures before the seven measures. This indicates that the 
spill-over effect was weakened after the implementations of the seven technical 
measures, and it can be interpreted as the result of an increasing the credibility of 
the LINK leading to stabilizing flows in the foreign exchange market obviating the 
need for interest rate adjustments to maintain the peg. 
Between September 2003 and the introduction of the three refinements, 
the positive  11 γ for the volatility of the exchange rate return and the overnight 
interest rate differential indicates spill-over between them. The spill-over 
disappears after the introduction of the refinements. It may be tempting to 
interpret this as a further increase in the credibility of the system. However, this is 
not the message one gets from the results using 3-month interest rates, because 
after the introduction of the three refinements, the positive  11 γ  and negative  22 γ  for 
the volatility of the exchange rate return and the 3-month interest rate differential 
show that the spill-over between them is present within the Convertibility Zone. 
Nevertheless, in both cases the size of the spill-over is small compared to what 
was observed before the introduction of the seven technical measures in 1998. 
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates of the Bivariate GARCH Model by Sub-sample Periods. 
 
              
  
Before the “Technical Measures”  
on 7 Sep 1998 
After 7 Sep 1998 and before revaluation 
pressure on the renminbi emerged on 23 
Sep 2003 
 
From 23 Sep 2003 to 18 May 2005 
 
From 23 Sep 2003 onwards 
                             
          
 Overnight  HKD-US 
interest rate 
differential — 
HKD/USD exchange 
rate return 
3-month HKD-US 
interest rate 
differential — 
HKD/USD exchange 
rate return 
Overnight HKD-US 
interest rate 
differential — 
HKD/USD exchange 
rate return 
3-month HKD-US 
interest rate 
differential — 
HKD/USD exchange 
rate return 
Overnight HKD-US 
interest rate 
differential — 
HKD/USD exchange 
rate return 
3-month HKD-US 
interest rate 
differential — 
HKD/USD exchange 
rate return 
Overnight HKD-US 
interest rate 
differential — 
HKD/USD exchange 
rate return 
3-month HKD-US 
interest rate 
differential — 
HKD/USD exchange 
rate return 
          
          
           
12 w   -0.2638 (0.4844)  0.0727 (0.0512)  -0.6934 (0.5594)  0.0510 (0.1706)  -0.3290* (0.0633)  0.0509* (0.0182)  -0.2652* (0.0978)  0.1394* (0.0230) 
           
21 w   -0.0043* (0.0005)  0.0008 (0.0008)  -0.0006* (0.0003)  -0.0003 (0.0003)  -0.0053 (0.0028)  -0.0309* (0.0013)  -0.0037* (0.0012)  -0.0057* (0.0016) 
           
11 α   0.4121* (0.0334)  0.7249* (0.0081)  0.9001* (0.0036)  0.9155* (0.0051) 0.8028*  (0.0083) 0.8860*  (0.0055) 0.8446*  (0.0055) 0.8128*  (0.0088) 
           
11 β   0.6433* (0.0206)  0.8415* (0.0149)  0.4904* (0.0130)  0.4365* (0.0140) 0.9332*  (0.0435) 0.5664*  (0.0166) 0.5933*  (0.0162) 0.5897*  (0.0189) 
           
11 γ   13.8184* (0.4296)  1.1066* (0.0701)  -0.1405 (10.4393)  -0.3475 (0.4390)  0.3551* (0.1017)  -0.0117 (0.0340)  -0.0008 (34.4586)  0.3227* (0.0450) 
           
22 α   0.7321* (0.0141)  0.8584* (0.0040)  0.9639* (0.0046)  0.9589* (0.0056) 0.9595*  (0.0042) 0.6399*  (0.0124) 0.9551*  (0.0023) 0.9443*  (0.0027) 
           
22 β   0.6093* (0.0177)  0.5100* (0.0083)  0.2096* (0.0130)  0.2153* (0.0141) 0.2266*  (0.0177) 1.2801*  (0.0207) 0.2770*  (0.0083) 0.3009*  (0.0085) 
           
22 γ   -0.0189* (0.0013)  -0.0535* (0.0024)  0.0011* (0.0003)  0.0046* (0.0012)  0.0039 (0.0026)  -0.0003 (0.4988)  0.0004 (0.0317)  -0.0327* (0.0051) 
           
No. of observations  1,215  2,519  1,310  432  1,306 
           
           
Notes:  The series of the overnight and the 3-month HKD-US interest rate differential start from 10 January 1994 and 10 January 1989 respectively. 
The series end at 23 September 2008. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  * denotes coefficient significant at the 5% level. 
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V.  Hong Kong dollar exchange rate dynamics in the target zone. 
 
V.I  Has the exchange rate process been mean-reverting since the three 
refinements? 
The introduction of the three refinements to the currency board on 18 May 
2005 established that the HKMA committed itself to maintain the HKD/USD 
exchange rate within a zone from 7.75 to 7.85 HKD per USD. It will do so by 
standing ready to intervene by unlimited amounts at the limits of this zone to 
prevent the exchange rate from braking through the limits. This type of exchange 
rate system has been referred to as a target zone model in the economics 
literature. 
  It has been argued that one can infer whether an exchange rate target 
zone is credible by studying the statistical properties of the movements in the 
exchange rate inside the zone. One school of thought argues that if the target 
zone is credible the exchange rate process must be mean-reverting, i.e. that there 
must be a tendency for the exchange rate to converge to the middle of the zone.   
  The driving force behind the mean-reverting property has been widely 
debated.
15  Some attribute it to central bank intervention within the target zone.
16  
Others argue that credibility induces “stability speculation” by market participants, 
producing forces to pull the exchange rate back to the central parity whenever it 
drifts away too much from it.
17 
  Another school of thought argues that the fact that the exchange rate 
behaves as a random-walk is not necessarily inconsistent with a credible target 
zone, provided that it is a bounded process.
18 There are many reasons for the 
exchange rate to have such a property, the most obvious one being potential 
central bank intervention and the ability of the central bank to defend the band.  
As long as the exchange rate is “well within” the band, market participants behave 
as if they are in a comfort zone and do not feel particularly compelled or 
                                                 
15  For example, Krugman (1991), Svensson (1993), Rose and Svensson (1994), and Anthony and 
MacDonald (1998). 
16  But the exchange rate may not exhibit such a property if intervention occurs only at the limits of 
the target zone. 
17 Many empirical studies attempted to investigate this theoretical prediction by examining the 
time-series properties of the European currencies in the era of the Exchange Rate Mechanism.  
Unfortunately, the results of these studies were mixed, for example, Ball and Roma (1994), 
Svensson (1993), Rose and Svensson (1994), Nieuwland et al. (1994), Anthony and 
MacDonald (1998, 1999), and Kanas (1998).  Some of the currencies were found to follow a 
random-walk process. 
18 See  Nicolau  (2002).   26
encouraged to pull the exchange rate towards the central parity. However, when 
the exchange rate moves closer to the boundary, the market may anticipate an 
intervention and push the rate back suddenly.  Simply put, a bounded process 
contains a reversion effect that only occurs close to the boundaries of the zone 
but not in or around the middle.  Statistically, it is thus possible for the random 
walk and bounded properties to co-exist, and together they are consistent with a 
credible system. The history of exchange rate movements since May 2005 gives 
us an opportunity to study the properties of the Hong Kong dollar under the new 
arrangement and, in particular, whether the currency follows a mean-reverting 
process.
19 
Hui and Fong (2007) study the dynamics of the daily Hong Kong dollar spot 
rate from 18 May 2005 to 29 August 2007 based on the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test and the variance-ratio (VR) test to determine whether the time series 
exhibit stationary and mean-reverting properties. They find that that after the 
introduction of the three refinements to the Linked Exchange Rate system in May 
2005 the Hong Kong dollar does not show any strong tendency to revert towards 
the centre of the Convertibility Zone. The results of the empirical tests based on a 
discrete-time econometric model using the maximum likelihood technique 
suggest, however, that the Hong Kong dollar followed a bounded process, one 
that is consistent with a fully credible exchange rate band.   
Casual observations of recent movements of the exchange rate suggest 
that the process might be different now than during the sample period studied by 
Hui and Fong. Looking at Chart 1 in Section II it seems that the exchange rate has 
often been hovering around the middle of the convertibility zone since sometime 
in the second half of 2007, suggestive of a mean-reverting tendency. One 
hypothesis is that the intra-marginal intervention in the foreign exchange market 
carried out by the HKMA on 23 October of that year has changed the dynamics of 
the exchange rate.
20 On that day, the Hong Kong dollar spot exchange rate once 
touched 7.75 although no banks approached the HKMA to activate the strong-side 
CU. The HKMA nevertheless intervened inside the target zone by selling Hong 
Kong dollars for US dollars. Subsequently the strong side CU was triggered once 
                                                 
19  Hui et al. (2008b) find that the 3-month and 12-month Hong Kong dollar forward exchange 
rates against the US dollar were mean-reverting during the period from 2 January 1996 to 4 
March 2005. 
20 Theoretical models of target zone exchange rate regimes predict that this would be the case.    27
on 26 October and five times on 31 October prompting further interventions.
21 
Following the methodology used in Hui and Fong we test for the existence 
of a break point in the time series process of the Hong Kong dollar in the second 
half of 2007.
22  We find that the process changes substantially after the break 
point identified to take place on 23 August 2007. In particular, from that date until 
the end of our sample (30 September 2008) the time series appears to be 
stationary in levels based the ADF test. In other words, during this period there 
exists a driving force in the Hong Kong dollar exchange rate dynamics to pull the 
rate towards the central parity. Although the exact break point identified by our 
tests does not coincide with the intra-marginal intervention in October 2007, it is 
close enough that one may still suspect that the actions at the time of the HKMA 
have had some impact on the subsequent behaviour of market participants and 
hence on the exchange rate itself. 
  To further test the exchange rate dynamics after the break point, we adopt 
the following specification of the bounded process: 
    () ( ) t t t t t t t dz x x dt x x dx
γ σ θ κ ln ln ln − + − =     ( 5 )  
where the Hong Kong dollar exchange rate S is transformed into x with a scale 
from zero to one: 
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γ − σ is the variance that depends on the level of S, γ  is a real number, dz 
is a standard random process and κ determines the speed of adjustment towards 
a mean of θ that represents the mean-reverting process.
23 It is noted that x is 
between zero and one as S is between 7.75 and 7.85. If the coefficientγ  is 
positive, the process will be bounded, because when S gets very close to either of 
the CUs (7.75 and 7.85), the variance of the exchange rate vanishes.
24  This in 
turn implies that the exchange rate is unlikely to touch either CU. The larger isγ , 
                                                 
21 See the December 2007 Half-Yearly Monetary Stability Report of the HKMA, page 52. It can be 
found at http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/public/qb200712/E_Halfyear.pdf  
22  The method in Zivot and Andrew (1992) based on trend and mean is used to test the break 
point. 
23 The specification of the bounded process is generalized from the specification used in Lo 
(2007). 
24  This is a consequence of the choice of functional form for x and its stochastic process. When S 
converges to 7.75, (-lnx)x will converge to zero. On the other hand, when S is 7.85, x is 1 and 
lnx is zero, hence (-lnx)x is zero.   28
the more sensitivity is the variance of the exchange rate process to the distance 
from the target zone limit. 
  The maximum likelihood estimation results are presented in Table 5. The 
Ljung-Box test statistics suggest that the model is adequately fitted because the 
standardised residuals are not serial correlated and not heteroskedastic.
25, 26 The 
parameters for the drift, κ  and θ , are estimated to be 0.085 and -0.718 
respectively, while the parameter for the variance, σ  and γ , are 0.126 and 1.811 
respectively. The coefficients are all statistically significant. Chart 10 shows the 
annualized volatility in the exchange rate (i.e. change in the exchange rate value) 
at different levels under the bounded process, that approaches zero at the strong- 
and weak-side limits.
27 
 
Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimations of discrete-time econometric 
model. 
Parameter Variable  Estimated 
Coefficients 
Standard Error  P-value 
κ  0.0849** 0.0282  0.0026 
θ  -0.7180** 0.0616  0.0000 
σ 0.1259**  0.0053  0.0000 
γ 1.8113**  0.1110  0.0000 
      
Log likelihood  267.3085     
Ljung-Box test on 
standardized residuals 
up to lag 24 
36.677   0.050 
Ljung-Box test on 
squared standardized 
residuals up to lag 24 
26.495   0.329 
Observations   238   
Notes:  ** and * denotes coefficient significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.  
                                                 
25 The Ljung-Box test, similar to the Portmanteau test, identifies whether the autocorrelations 
among data are jointly zero up to a specified lag.  Compared with the Portmanteau test, it is 
more powerful.  Accepting the null hypothesis of the test means that the data is not serial 
correlated. 
26  The standardized residual is the residual divided by the estimated volatility.  If the model fits 
well, the standardized residuals will be serial uncorrelated and homoskedastic.  The 
homoskedasticity can be checked by the Ljung-Box test on the jointly zero-autocorrelation 
among the squared standardised residuals. Accepting the null hypothesis of the test suggests 
that the standardised residuals are homoskedastic.  See McLeod and Li (1983) for details. 
27 The changes are not symmetric at the central parity because most of the time the exchange 
rates had stayed in the strong-side Convertibility Zone during the estimation period.   29
 
Chart 10: Annualised volatility in HKD exchange rate at different levels. 
  
 
The empirical tests show that the mean-reverting process and bounded 
process co-exist in the Hong Kong dollar dynamics after the break point. The 
presence of mean reversion reflects that market participants have anticipated the 
Hong Kong dollar exchange more sticky towards the central parity.  
 
V.II A remaining puzzle: evidence on credibility from the forward exchange 
market. 
  The evidence presented so far suggests that the current target zone 
system enjoys a substantial amount of credibility by market participants as there 
has been only one episode during which the (strong-side) CU has been hit, and 
since the Hong Kong dollar spot rate appears to be mean-reverting inside the 
convertibility zone. Furthermore, the credibility seems to have been achieved from 
the very start of the new regime as judged by the evidence in sections III and IV. 
On this interpretation of the evidence, the behaviour of the 12-month forward 
exchange rate presents a puzzle. 
  Chart 11 shows that the 12-month forward rate of the HKD against the USD 
was consistently been outside the convertibility zone between October 2005 and 
the end of 2007 and on several occasions since then. This implies that profits 
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could be made on outright forward contracts during such periods provided that the 
future spot rate stays within the convertibility zone. If we interpret the forward rate 
as an indicator of expected value of the future spot rate on the part of market 
participants, this seems to suggest that there are doubts in the market about the 
commitment of the HKMA to 7.75 as the strong side CU.
,28 
  Of course, there are reasons why positions in outright forward contracts 
may not be taken even if the expected future spot rate is different from the forward 
rate. One such reason is transactions costs which refer not only to bid-ask 
spreads, but also to allocating scarce human or other resources to this particular 
market and away from other markets.
29 Another reason could be risks of mark-to-
market losses in the event that the forward rate moves even further away from the 
convertibility zone. Traders may have limits on the size of such losses they may 
incur, which could limit their ability to engage in this type of trade.  
 
Chart 11: HKD 12-month forward exchange rate. 
  
 
                                                 
28 The ‘expected value of the future spot rate’ should be interpreted in the statistical sense as the 
probability-weighted sum of possible future values of the spot rate. The probabilities in question 
are the subjective probabilities held by market participants. Viewed in this way, the forward rate 
need not be the most likely (i.e. with the highest probability) value of the future spot rate. It could 
for example be that the current value of the forward rate reflects a high probability that the future 
spot rate will stay within the convertibility zone together with a relatively small probability attached 
to a large appreciation of the HKD, i.e. a small probability that the bands of the convertibility zone 
will be changed. 
29 Although one would have thought that this type of trade could be carried out relatively 
mechanically through program trading which would substantially reduce the opportunity cost 
aspects. 
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So it may be that market expectations of future spot rates are consistent with 
the convertibility zone without trading taking place to force the forward rate always 
to lie inside the zone. While this would be in line with our general argument that 
the current systems enjoys a large degree of credibility, the behaviour of the 
forward rate in the period following the introduction of the new exchange rate for 
the renminbi casts some doubt on this interpretation. Chart 12 shows the 
movement of both the HKD/USD 12-month forward exchange rate and the 12-
month non-deliverable forward (NDF) rate for the renminbi relative to the US 
dollar from during the period from the introduction of the three refinements and 
until the end of February 2007. It is quite clear that the broad movement of the 
HKD forward rate mimicked closely those of the NDF rate during part of this 
period, specifically from July 21 (the start of the new exchange rate regime for the 
renminbi) until the end of 2007. Whatever factors determined the movements of 
the NDF rate also seem to have been responsible for movements in the HKD 
forward rate. If indeed these rates reflected expectations about future spot rates, 
then it seems that market participants placed some non-negligible probability on 
the possibility that the HKD would follow the RBM as it appreciated during this 
period.
 30,31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Note that commentators regularly use the value of the RMB NDF as an indicator of what the 
market expects the future RMB spot rate to be. Symmetry suggests that a similar interpretation of 
the HKD forward rate may be warranted. It is worth noting that while the forward rate is frequently 
used as an indicator of the market’s expectation of the future spot rate, empirical studies on most 
currencies show that it does not turn out to be a very accurate predictor, ex. post..  
31 A regression of the Hong Kong dollar forward rate on the renminbi NDF for this period gives an 
R
2 in excess of 75%.   32
Chart 12: 12-month forward exchange rates. 
  
  What would explain such expectations, and why did they seem to have 
changed at the end of 2007? Two factors may explain the reasons behind the 
expectations of a link between the Hong Kong dollar and the renminbi. The first is 
the increasing trade and financial linkages between Hong Kong and Mainland 
gave rise to arguments in some quarters that it would be in Hong Kong’s interest 
to link its currency to the renminbi rather than to the US dollar. Although it was 
possible to refute this argument on strictly economic grounds,
32 a second factor 
made the idea seem superficially attractive. This was that the steady appreciation 
of the renminbi made it almost certain that it would reach 7.8 RMB/USD sometime 
in late 2006 or early 2007, in other words that there would be parity between the 
Hong Kong dollar and the renminbi. Some observers thought that would be an 
opportune time to peg Hong Kong’s currency to that of the Mainland.  
  Why did the co-movements between the two forward rates cease come 
around the end of the year. A possible explanation relies on the communication 
efforts of the HKMA. Several Viewpoint articles by the Chief Executive with titles 
such as “Hong Kong's business cycle synchronisation with Mainland China and 
the US” (September 21, 2006), “Market expectation of renminbi exchange rate 
movements” (October 5), “The renminbi and the Hong Kong dollar” (November 
30) were published during the fall of 2006 and other efforts were also made to 
communicate to the markets that there was no intention to abandon the link to the 
US dollar and peg to the renminbi. These efforts appear to have borne fruit by the 
                                                 
32 See, for example, Greenwood (2008), p. 289, and Genberg, Liu, and Jin (2006). 
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end of the year, and when the RMB/USD rate passed through the HKD/USD 
convertibility zone in the beginning of 2007, it went almost unnoticed by foreign 
exchange market traders at least as judged by pressures on the spot rate at the 
time. Furthermore, since this episode the link between the Honk Kong dollar 
forward rate and the renminbi NDF rate has disappeared (Chart 13). 
 
Chart 13: Forward exchange rates. 
  
 
VI. Concluding remarks. 
  Using methods derived from modern finance theory we have presented 
evidence showing that reforms of the Linked Exchange Rate System have been 
well accepted and have had their intended effects as judged both by the 
behaviour of the exchange rate itself and by various derivative products that 
incorporate expectations of exchange rate movements. Arguably the system has 
grown stronger and more credible over time. Part of the reason for this may be 
that the reforms have always gone in the direction of making the system more 
rules based and hence less discretionary. But more fundamentally the credibility of 
the system is surely also related to the supportive strong fiscal position of the 
government which has meant that there has never been any serious question 
about the need for financing of government deficit by monetary means. In addition 
it should be mentioned that prices and wages in Hong Kong are quite flexible 
which makes the adjustments to shocks less costly than they otherwise would 
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be.
33 These underlying factors bode well for the continuation of Hong Kong’ fixed 
exchange arrangement. 
 
 
                                                 
33 See Pauwels and Zhang (2008) on wages and Yetman (2008) on prices.   35
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